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TERMINATION OF SEC RECEIVERSHIPS
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
THOMAS J. SCHWARZ*

T

I.

INTRODUCTION

HE equity receivership, once the favored method for corporate
reorganizations, has long lain dormant. Recently, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has revived the equity receiver as a
method of enforcement of federal securities laws, especially the Securities Act of 1933,1 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 and the
Investment Company Act of 1940. 3 In the first eight months of 1974
the SEC requested the appointment of a receiver in the federal court
more than fifty times. 4 This Article extensively reviews the various
*Mr.
Schwarz received his A.B. from Hamilton College and his J.D. cur laude from
Fordham University, where he was Articles Editor of this Review. A member of the New York
Bar, he is associated with the firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act].
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a(I)-(52) (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1940 Act].
4. See, e.g., SEC Litigation Releases for 1974 (cited herein by number): No. 6461, SEC v.
Bachinskas-Nation Invs., Inc. (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 1974); No. 6462, SEC v. Petersen (D. Minn.
Aug. 1, 1974); No. 6457, SEC v. Dizon (C.D. Cal. July 31, 1974); No. 6455, SEC v. Royal
Airline, Inc., Civ. No. 74-202N (S.D. Cal. July 29, 1974); No. 6456, SEC v. Falcon Fund, Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1974); No. 6434, SEC v. Cooperative Church Fin., Inc. (S.D. Tex. July 16,
1974); No. 6432, United States v. Johnson (5th Cir. July 16, 1974); No. 6423, SEC v. Aldersgate
Foundation, Inc., Civ. No. 73-86-Civ. Or -Y (M.D. Fla. July 9, 1974); No. 6411, SEC v.
lorens Associates, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1974); No. 6410, SEC v. National Farmers Org.,
Inc. (S.D. Iowa June 25, 1974); No. 6386, SEC v. Michael See., Inc. (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1974);
No. 6385, United States v. Randle (E.D. Va. June 4, 1974); No. 6384, SEC v. Lavin, Crim. No.
CR 74-168 (D. Ariz. June 4, 1974); No. 6382, SEC v. Gem State Silver-Gold, Inc., Civ. No.
2-74-32 (D. Idaho June 3, 1974); No. 6381, SEC v. Standard Dredging Corp. (D.D.C. June 3,
1974); No. 6368, United States v. International Chem. Dev. Corp. (D. Utah May 13, 1974); No.
6365, SEC v. Reese (N.D. Tex. May 13, 1974); No. 6363, United States v. Rio De Oro Mining
Co., Crim. No. 74-72 (D. Utah May 13, 1974); No. 6360, SEC v. Triebick (S.D.N.Y. May 8,
1974); No. 6359, SEC v. Financial Fund, Inc. (W.D. Va. May 8, 1974); No. 6341, SEC v.
Destiny Oil & Gas Corp. (E.D. Tenn. April 30, 1974); No. 6339, SEC v. Continental Land
Management Corp. (S.D. Fla. April 30, 1974); No. 6337, SEC v. Main St. Sec., Inc. (N.D. Tex.
April 29, 1974); No. 6338, SEC v. Continental Silver Corp. of Nev., Civ. No. 74-364 (D. Colo.
April 29, 1974); No. 6324, SEC v. Harper Johnson Co. (S.D.N.Y. April 17, 1974); No. 6323,
SEC v. Destiny Oil & Gas Corp. (E.D. Tenn. April 17, 1974); No. 6322, SEC v. Commonwealth
Sec. Inv., Inc. (E.D. Ky. April 17, 1974); No. 6308, SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc. (D. Ariz. April
5, 1974); No. 6297, SEC v. Christian Bonds, Inc. (,V.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1974); No. 6296, SEC v.
International Commodities Exch., Inc. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1974); No. 6278, SEC v. Topper
Corp. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1974); No. 6275, SEC v. Golden Gate Fund, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12,
1974); No. 6274, SEC v. London Sec., Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1974); No. 6266, SEC v.
Memme & Co. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1974); No. 6264, SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Associates, Inc.
(W.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 1974);, No. 6263, SEC v. International Commodities Exch., Inc. (C.D. Cal.
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alternatives open to the court and to the receiver for the disposition of
(the "corporate subject') in a receivership initiated by
the corporation
5
the SEC.
In the early part of this century equity receiverships were employed
to reorganize corporations, most frequently railroads, which had come
upon difficult times. The original Bankruptcy Act 6 failed to provide an
effective method for corporate reorganization. 7 In 1933, section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act 8 dealing solely with railroad reorganizations, and
section 77B 9 for other corporate reorganizations, were adopted as a part
of the Bankruptcy Act. Subsequently, in 1938, the Bankruptcy Act
was revised 1 ° and Chapter X was adopted to provide for corporate
reorganizations. 1 Since the appointment of a receiver can, under some
circumstances, be an act of bankruptcy, 1 2 the modernization of the
Bankruptcy Act has effectively curtailed the equity receivership as a
creditors' method of preserving assets and obtaining redress. 13
Feb. 28, 1974); No. 6262, SEC v. Demetrios, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1974); No. 6256, United
Feb. 25, 1974); No. 6255, SEC v. Olympic Petro. Corp. (N.D. Tex.
States v. Lysen (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 25, 1974); No. 6242, SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., Civ. No. 73-2642 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 11, 1974); No. 6241, SEC v. Raywood Placers, Ltd. (E.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 1974); No. 6240,
SEC v. Bio-Medicus, Inc. (D. Minn. Feb. 11, 1974); No. 6236, SEC v. Memme & Co. (2d Cir.
Feb. 7, 1974); No. 6235, United States v. Strub (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1974); No. 6234, SEC v.
Andrew McDonald Ltd., Civ. No. 2207-73 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1974); No. 6219, SEC v. Abitron
Corp., Civ. No. 575-73-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 25, 1974); No. 6218, United States v. Smither (D.Ore.
Jan. 25, 1974); No. 6217, SEC v. Strathmore Distillery Co. (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 1974); No. 6214,
SEC v. Real-Tex Enterprises, Inc. (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1974); No. 6202, SEC v. Arata (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 14, 1974); No. 6198, SEC v. Mount Everest Corp. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1974); No. 6237,
Abatronix, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1974); No. 6201, SEC v. Jeroboam Wines, Ltd. (D. Mont.
Jan. 4, 1974).
5. This Article will not deal with the grounds for or the propriety of the appointment of a
receiver in general, or the obligations of a receiver during the period of the receivership.
6. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
7. See generally 6 Collier on Bankruptcy 0.01, at 5 (14th ed. J.Moore ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Collier].
8. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1474.
9. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 912.
10. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
11. See generally J. Rosenberg, R. Swaine & R. Walker, Corporate Reorganization and the
Federal Court (1924); P. Payne, Plans of Corporate Reorganization (1934); Chandler, The
Revised Bankruptcy Act of 1938, 24 A.B.A.J. 880 (1938); Douglas, Improvement in Federal
Procedure for Corporate Reorganization, 24 A.B.A.J. 875 (1938); Levi & Moore, Bankruptcy and
Reorganization: A Survey of Changes (pt. III), 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 398 (1938); Swaine, Federal
Legislation for Corporate Reorganizations; An Affirmative View, 19 A.B.A.J. 698 (1933); Morford,
Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganizations; A Negative View, 19 A.B.A.J. 702 (1933);
Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, in 8 Some
Legal Phases of Corporate Financing Reorganization and Regulation 133 (1931); Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 Yale L.J. 573 (1939).
12. See note 90 infra and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the use of equity receiverships in connection with creditors' proceed-
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Although obsolete as a creditors' remedy, equity receiverships have
become the judicial remedy preferred by the SEC second only to
injunctions. 1 4 Neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act contains any
explicit authorization for the appointment of a receiver, S and the 1940
Act has only a limited provision; 16 however, it is now beyond question
that the SEC has authority to request the appointment of a receiver in
aid of its enforcement jurisdiction. 17 In the typical situation the SEC
will apply to a court for an injunction and for the appointment of a
receiver 18 alleging fraud and mismanagement of a public company
or a broker-dealer. 19 Once the receiver is appointed the SEC remains a
party to the litigation and should be consulted on any actions taken by
the receiver in connection with the performance of his duties.2 0
After the receiver has been appointed and has carried out his initial
obligations, 21 the important question becomes how to terminate the
receivership and permit both the receiver and the belabored court to
get on with their other affairs. After an initial discussion of the
appropriateness of the application of federal law, the remainder of this
Article will deal with the question of termination of the receivership.
ings see 6 Collier 0.04; Dodd, Equity Receiverships As Proceedings In Rem, 23 iI. L Rev. 105
(1928); Sabel, Equity Jurisdiction in the United States Courts with Reference to Consent
Receiverships, 20 Iowa L. Rev. 83 (1934). See also Annual Report of Special Committee on
Equity Receiverships, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 299-336 (1927); Mayer, Federal
Equity Receiverships, Address to the Bar Ass'n of the City of New York (1924). Mayer
contrasted equity receivership with bankruptcy as follows: "Bankruptcy ordinarily . . . is the
undertaker. The equity receivership is the physician who desires to cure the patient." Id. at 165.
See generally 16 IV. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (rev. ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as Fletcher]; 17 id. §§ 8554-77.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. In 1957 the SEC requested an amendment to the 1934 Act to provide for such
authorization but no such legislation was passed. See 103 Cong. Rec. 11,635-38 (1957).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1970).
17. See SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968). See also Mathews,
SEC Civil Injunctive Actions---,
5 Rev. of Sec. Reg. 949 (1972); cases cited notes 44-50 infra.
For a discussion of the use of receiverships in connection with the Small Business Investment Act
of 1958 see Weinmann, Receiverships Under the Small Business Investment Act, 25 Bus. Law.
237 (1969).
18. It has been held that both an injunction and the appointment of a receiver may be
granted in one action and that the remedies are not mutually exclusive. SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach
Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510, 518 (2d Cir. 1970).
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Counsellors, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v.
H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); SEC v. The Technical Fund, Inc.
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,515 (D. Mass. 1972) (summary of
complalnt).
20. East v. Crowdus, 302 F.2d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1962); SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 267 F.
Supp. 562, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
21. See generally 1 R. Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers §§ 117-22 (3d
ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
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II. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL REMEDIAL LAW
Although the receiver is appointed to protect rights established
under federal securities laws, there is usually no applicable remedial
statutory provision for the disposition of the corporate subject. The
question thus arises whether Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins 2 2 requires
that the federal court apply a remedy pursuant to the substantive or
conflicts law of the state in which the court sits. The answer is in the
negative:
If the case is one governed by federal law, as for example by a congressional
enactment governing interstate commerce, state conflicts rules are irrelevant because
state law has no bearing on the case. And the same will be true even in the absence of
a federal statute if the case so involves federal rights that a "federal common law"
23
governing them can be spelled out.

In Bryan v. Bartlett,24 a federal receiver brought suit to recover on
notes owed his corporation. Seeking to assert certain defenses, the
defendants urged that state rather than federal law should apply.
Noting that jurisdiction was "based, not on diversity of citizenship,
but on a federal equity receivership arising from violation of the
federal securities regulation statutes," and that the "receiver was
appointed . . . to prevent further violations . . . and to preserve the
assets for the benefit of the investor-creditors of the companies, who
are primarily individual citizens of many different states," 2 s the court
held:
The policy underlying the federal Securities Act of 1933 is to protect investors from the
fraudulent sale of securities and the common loss of investment which follows from
violations of the act. In unsnarling the tangled affairs of these corporations to preserve
insofar as possible assets for distribution to the defrauded investors, the receiver is
performing a federal function. These are substantial reasons for applying a federal rule
26
of decision to this case.

Similarly, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,27 the Court held that a shareholder was entitled to more than declaratory relief for proxy violations
by his company, stating:
It is for the federal courts "to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief"
where federally secured rights are invaded. "And it is also well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
22. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23. R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law 154 (1968) (footnote omitted). See also notes 45-47
infra and accompanying text.
24. 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
25. Id.at 32.
26. Id.at 32-33.
27. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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done."... Section 27 grants the District Courts jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title .
"The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of recover)'
afforded by the Act. And the power to make the right of recovery effective implies the
power to utilize any of the procedures or actions normally available to the litigant
28
according to the exigencies of the particular case."

III.

THE REMEDIES

Given the applicability of federal law, the question becomes what
disposition can be made with respect to the corporate subject. 2 9 The
question should be placed in proper perspective. Typically, a corporation in receivership is under the supervision of the federal court sitting
in that state where most of the assets of the corporation are located. 30
Whether the corporation is foreign, i.e., organized under the laws of a
sister state, or domestic, i.e., organized under the laws of the state in
which the federal court sits, there are shareholders throughout the
country. Does the federal court have the power to: (a) liquidate the
corporation; (b) dissolve the corporation; (c) order the receiver to call a
shareholders' meeting to consider action; or (d) order the receiver to
proceed to the state of incorporation to seek state remedies?
A. Liquidation vs. Dissolution
In spite of the pragmatic similarity between dissolution and liquidation, there exists an important theoretical distinction. Liquidation is
28.

Id. at 433-34 (citations omitted). See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.

363 (1943) (federal notes); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (Sherman
Act); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (1933 Act); United States v.
Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965) (eminent domain); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339
F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965) ('[Elven in the absence of
express statute, federal law may govern what might seem an issue of local law because the federal
interest is dominant." Id. at 827-28); Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1964) (1934 Act); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (1934 Act); Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (Sherman Act);
Collier v. Granger, 258 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (1933 Act). See generally Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383 (1964); Hill, The
Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024
(1967); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1953).
It should also be noted that the problem of forum shopping with which Erie concerned itself
does not arise in an action instituted by the SEC since the Commission brings enforcement
actions only in federal courts. See 67 Harv. L. Rev. 836, 843 (1954); 59 Harv. L. Rev. 966,
970-72 (1946).
29. Despite the applicability of federal law, state court precedent is helpful.
30. It would be improper to appoint a receiver in a district if most of the assets were
elsewhere. See 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice 66.05(2), at 1927 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Moore]; cf. Gatch, Tennant & Co. v. Mobile & O.R.R, 59 F.2d 217 (S.D. Ala. 1932);
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the winding up and distribution of assets among creditors and
stockholders. 31 The dissolution of a corporation is the termination of
its very existence by the cancelling of its charter. 3 2 Liquidation by
itself does not destroy the corporate shell, although, as a practical
matter, once the assets of the corporation have been distributed, the
corporation will be unable to pay its franchise tax and will be
dissolved pursuant to state law. 33 According to one author, it was first
said that liquidation was not dissolution in order to meet the
objection
34
that a court of equity could not dissolve a corporation.
An examination of the law of Delaware, the state of incorporation of
a great many publicly held corporations, demonstrates the distinction
between liquidation and dissolution. Probably the clearest of the cases
35
on this question is Haas v. Sinaloa Exploration & Development Co.,
where a receiver was appointed on the ground of insolvency. The
court noted that the appointment of such a receiver had the effect of
transferring the assets of the corporation into a fund for the creditors
and stockholders. Thus, the receiver could either reduce the assets to
cash and distribute the proceeds among the creditors and stockholders
(liquidate) or return the assets to the corporation. "But in neither event
'' 36
is the corporate existence terminated by the receivership decree.
Similarly, in Lichens Co. v. Standard Commercial Tobacco Co.,

3

the court acknowledged the distinction:
Originally, jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, in order to wind up a solvent corporation, was largely denied on the theory that it was equivalent to a decree for
dissolution, which was generally within the sole province of the legislative body.
. . . Technically at least the appointment of a receiver does not dissolve the
corporation .... 38

Hutchinson v. American Palace-Car Co., 104 F. 182 (C.C.D. Me. 1900); see also Guy v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 429 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1970).
31. United States v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 10 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), affd,
77 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1935), aff'd, 296 U.S. 463 (1936); 54 C.J.S. Liquidation 565-66 (1948).
32. Black's Law Dictionary 560 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
33. See, e.g., N.Y. Tax Law § 203-a(3) (McKinney 1966). However, during the pendency of
the receivership, the receiver must pay the franchise taxes out of the assets of the estate.
Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 344-45 (1932).
34. J. Tingle, The Stockholder's Remedy of Corporate Dissolution 31 (1959).
35. 17 Del. Ch. 253, 152 A. 216 (1930).
36. Id., 152 A. at 217.
37. 28 Del. Ch. 220, 40 A.2d 447 (1944).
38. Id. at 223, 40 A.2d at 452 (citations omitted). See also Clarke Memorial College v.
Monaghan Land Co., 257 A.2d 234 (Del. Ch. 1969). In Campbell v. Pennsylvania Indus., Inc.,
99 F. Supp. 199 (D. Del. 1951), the court stated: "I have not felt it necessary to dwell on the
question of the power of a federal court, sitting as a court of equity, to dissolve a corporation as
distinguished from its power to order the winding up of its affairs. Clearly dissolution is the more
drastic action . . . ." Id. at 206.
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The distinction is brought into sharp focus by the statute common to
Delaware3 9 and many other states4" under which a dissolved corporation exists only to wind up its business and close its affairs, i.e., to
liquidate.
B. Liquidation of the Corporate Subject
1. Power to Liquidate
There has been great confusion in the cases discussing liquidation,
resulting
primarily from a failure to distinguish between the question of the power of the court
to wind up the affairs of a corporation . . . and the
question, assuming power, of the
41
advisability of doing so in any particular case.

Since it is generally accepted that a suit for the appointment of a
receiver and for liquidation may be brought in federal court, the
proper question with respect to liquidation (as opposed to dissolution)
is whether the court should exercise its power and not whether the
power exists.
Perhaps the leading case establishing the power of a federal court to
appoint a receiver is Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs. 42 In that
case a shareholder brought suit in New Jersey district court for the
appointment of a receiver to conserve the assets of a Delaware
corporation. 4 3 The fact that the corporation was foreign was held not
to deprive the federal court of jurisdiction to appoint a receiver44
although the question of liquidation was not raised.
An early decision, Klein v. Wilson & Co., 45 indicated that a federal

court had the same power as the state court to appoint a receiver but
no power to order winding up. As the cases progressed, however, the
courts began to realize that they had the power to liquidate the local
assets of a corporation, either foreign or domestic. Although earlier
cases had held that state law governed, 4 6 later cdses held that federal,
47
not state law determined whether liquidation could be ordered.
39. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 278 (Supp. 1968) provides in part: "All corporations [which have
been dissolved] . .. shall nevertheless be continued, for the term of three years from such ...
dissolution... for the purpose of... enabling them gradually to settle and close their business
40. See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1728 (1940).
41. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a Corporation at
the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 220, 221 (1940).
42. 274 U.S. 208 (1927) (Brandeis, J.).
43. Id. at 209.
44. Id. at 214.
45. 7 F.2d 772, 775 (D.N.J. 1925).
46. See, e.g., Potter v. Victor Page Motors Corp., 300 F. 885, 888 (D. Conn. 1924).
47. Campbell v. Pennsylvania Indus., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 199, 204 (D. Del. 1951).
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In SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 a Delaware district court was
requested to appoint a receiver for a Delaware corporation. The action
was brought to enjoin violations of the 1940 Act where the management of the fund had ceased to function. 4 9 The court ordered liquidation stating that it need not look to the state law but only to the federal
law as this receivership was a remedial right of a federal court of
equity that "cannot be enlarged or limited by state law." 50
In Bailey v. Proctor,5 1 the court held "th'at a court of equity has
inherent power to appoint a receiver to liquidate a corporation or
investment trust where fraud, mismanagement or abuse of trust is
present whether or not insolvency is likewise present.15 2 Bailey,
however, did not involve liquidation of a foreign corporation. The
court also stated that the intervening solvency of the trust did not
deprive it of jurisdiction because, once jurisdiction was assumed, it
continued until equity was done. 53 Nor was the Investment Company
Act's failure to provide for liquidation seen as an obstacle. 54
More recently, in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v.
SEC, 55 the court stated:
We do not dispute the fact that it is within the well established power of the federal
court, sitting as a court of equity, to order liquidation of a solvent corporation where
56
there is no other course available to remedy a situation that needs solution.
48. 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943).
49. Id. at 714.
50. Id. at 715. At the same time as the law was developing in the federal courts, the state
courts were beginning to recognize their power to appoint receivers to take charge of the local
assets of foreign corporations. See, e.g., In re Mercantile Guar. Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 426, 48
Cal. Rptr. 589 (1st Dist. 1965) (liquidation ordered); Low v. R.P.K. Pressed Metal Co., 91 Conn.
91, 99 A. 1 (1916); Scholl v. Allen, 237 Ky. 716, 36 S.W.2d 353 (1931); Starr v. Bankers' Union of
the World, 81 Neb. 377, 116 N.W. 61 (1908); Hill v. Dealers' Credit Corp., 102 N.J. Eq. 310,
140 A. 569 (1928); Wettengel v. Robinson, 288 Pa. 362, 136 A. 673 (1927); Cunliffe v. Consumers'
Ass'n of America, 280 Pa. 263, 124 A. 501 (1924); Note, Internal Regulation of Foreign
Corporations, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 968 (1929); Note, Jurisdiction to Liquidate the Affairs of a
Foreign Corporation on a Stockholder's Bill, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1931).
51. 160 F.2d 78 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 834 (1947). See Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC,
151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946); Note, Bailey v. Proctor-A New
Jurisdiction of Equity in the Field of Corporate Winding Up, 34 Va. L. Rev. 56 (1948); 60 Harv.
L. Rev. 816 (1947).
52. 160 F.2d at 81.
53. Id.at 82.
54. Id. at 83. In a later proceeding, Bailey v. Proctor, 166 F.2d 392 (1st Cir. 1948), the court
held that the former decision "quite clearly contemplated dissolution of the trust." Id. at 396. The
court, however, vacated the district court's order to dissolve and allowed the trust to continue
after the creditors were paid off: "Since no one will be injured, we see no reason not to allow the
present equitable owners of the trust property to decide what to do with their own money." Id. at
397.
55. 264 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1959).
56. Id. at 211.
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Despite the recognition of their power to liquidate, however, some
courts refused to exercise jurisdiction on grounds of forum non conveniens where a foreign corporation was involved. Thus, in Marion v.
British Type Investors, Inc., S7 the court held:
For this court to compel such winding up would amount to an interference with the
management of the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, which this court should
not undertake but should leave to the Delaware courts."

Most of the recent cases, however, have not been troubled with the
state of incorporation. For example, in Dallasega v. Victoria Amuse-

ment Enterprises, 9 all the assets of a Delaware corporation were
in Pennsylvania but the Pennsylvania district court refused to liquidate
because the remedy was too drastic for the situation. However, the
court noted that the corporation was foreign in a technical sense only,
implying that had the situation been more compelling, liquidation
would have been ordered. 60 And, more recently, in Bellevue Gardens,
Inc. v. Hill,61 it was held per now Chief Justice Burger, that the court
had inherent power to liquidate foreign corporations whose assets were
within the District of Columbia.
2. The Propriety of Liquidation
Although the federal courts have the power to order liquidation, the
propriety of exercising that power is a separate issue. Two problems
presented by a liquidation order were discussed in Los Angeles Trust
62
in which an action was
Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC,
brought to restrain violations of federal securities legislation. The
63
district court appointed a receiver with instructions to liquidate.
Reversing, the Ninth Circuit noted that: (i) since the trial court found
insolvency, liquidation, if appropriate, should proceed in bankruptcy;

and (ii) liquidation would be an additional penalty not contemplated
by Congress. 6" These problems will be discussed in inverse order.

57. 94 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
58. Id.at 756.
59. 43 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1942).
60. Id. at 698. See Williamson v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 56 F.2d 503 (7th Cir.
1932), where, although liquidation was not requested, the court did inquire into the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation.
61. 297 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also Jacobs v. Tenney, 316 F. Supp. 151, 170 (D.
Del. 1970), where the court stated: "A federal court has the power to inquire into the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation and the power to appoint a receiver of a foreign corporation
-even when the assets of the corporation lie outside the district of the appointing court."
62. 285 F.2d 162, 181-82 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961), modifing 186 F.
Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal. 1960). An earlier opinion involving the same parties is discussed at note 55
supra and accompanying text.
63. 186 F. Supp. at 890.
64. 285 F.2d at 182.
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Liquidation-"An Additional Penalty"

The problem whether liquidation imposes an additional penalty is
not unique to remedies for securities violations. In another context the
Supreme Court has indicated that:
When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained
in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic
65
power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes.

The 1940 Act provides for liquidation in cases where there has been
a failure to register. 6 6 However, as noted previously, no similar
provision is included for other violations of the 1940 Act, or for
violations of the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act. 67 Although it is arguable
that liquidation is impliedly prohibited except for violations of the
registration provisions of the 1940 Act, the full jurisdiction of the court
may be exercised unless a statute expressly prohibits the exercise of
inherent equity powers. 68 Therefore, that liquidation may not be
expressly permitted by statute should not present an obstacle to its

utilization in an appropriate situation.
b.

Receivership vs. Bankruptcy

Whether liquidation should be through the bankruptcy court rather
69
than through an equity receivership presents a more serious problem.
i.

Railroad Reorganization Cases

During the late 1930's and early 1940's some decisions questioned
the propriety of permitting an equity receiver to reorganize railroads
since section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act 70 had been passed specifically
for that purpose. In New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland
Railroad,7 1 a receiver had been appointed to reorganize a railroad.
65. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960). Even in Los
Angeles Trust, the court recognized this when it stated: "[C]ongress must be taken to have acted
cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief . . . ." 285 F.2d at 182.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "In any proceeding ... to enforce
compliance with section 80a-7 of this title, the court as a court of equity . . . shall have
jurisdiction to appoint a trustee, who with the approval of the court shall have power to dispose
of any or all of [the company's] assets, subject to such terms and conditions as the court may
prescribe."
67. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
68. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1946); see SEC v. Wong, 252 F.
Supp. 608, 613 (D.P.R. 1966); SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
69. For a discussion of this issue with respect to the benefits of bankruptcy, see Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York, Annual Report of Special Committee on Equity Receiverships for
1926-27, 321-24 (1927).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
71. 143 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1944).
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The court held that the proper tribunal would be the bankruptcy
court, noting that it would frustrate the purpose of section 77 of the
72
Bankruptcy Act to allow the equity receivership to continue.
Moreover, the court was not impressed with the argument that the
administration of the receivership had proceeded to such a point that 3it
would be detrimental to all concerned to discharge the receiver.7
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. St. Joe Paper Co., 7 4 a
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act for reorganization of an insolvent railway corporation, a lower court dismissed the proceeding and
ordered that the trustee turn over the corporation's property to himself
as equity receiver. Holding that the property should have remained
with the trustee in bankruptcy, the court of appeals said:
- Since the United States District courts are courts of law (civil and criminal), equity,
admiralty, and bankruptcy, it is ordinarily more logical to shift from an equity
receivership to a bankruptcy proceeding than it is to reverse the movement. Courts of
equity may enjoin suits at law and keep creditors at bay, but they cannot discharge
debts, reduce or adjust them, or otherwise impair the obligations of contracts; but the
bankruptcy courts,
within the limits of the Fifth Amendment, may do any and all of
75
these things.

The reluctance to use an equity receiver to reorganize a railroad is
attributable to a desire not to frustrate the specific intent of section 77
and therefore should not serve as authority to deny liquidation through
an equity receivership in a securities case. Chapter X76 is a general
provision for all business corporations enacted before business had
developed to its present stage and before man had learned the fine art
of misusing securities and defrauding investors. Permitting a receiver
to liquidate a non-railroad corporation in an appropriate situation
would not frustrate the general purpose of Chapter X, which is to
provide a ready remedy for corporate reorganizations.
ii.

Securities Cases

Completely apart from the questionable authority of the railroad
reorganization cases, some federal securities cases have indicated that
72. Id. at 184.
73. Id. at 185.
74. 216 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 835. In Badenhausen v. Guaranty Trust Co., 145 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1944), the court
approved a plan of reorganization for the railroads. The court noted that because the proceedings
had gone on for years and that much work had been done under the careful scrutiny of the
district judge, the use of an equity receivership would be proper without reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Act. This case is easily distinguishable because the date upon which the plan
originated was prior to the enactment of § 77 and because no petition in bankruptcy had been

filed.
76.

11 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (1970).
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the remedy of liquidation ought to be limited. In Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks, 77 the SEC commenced an action to enjoin an
allegedly insolvent broker from further trading and for the appointment of a receiver. The court discussed the propriety of having the
receiver liquidate:
Less well established is the scope of the powers that a receiver may be granted. Thus,
the power to liquidate the estate has been held in one circuit to be almost nonexistent
under the analogous provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, . . .see Los Angeles Trust
Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC . .
Similarly, in Esbitt v. Dutch-American
Mercantile Corp., . . . we expressed strong reservations as to the propriety of allowing
a receiver to liquidate; it was permitted only because it had been virtually completed
by the time the appeal had been decided. As we said in Esbitt, which also concerned a
receiver appointed in an action under the Securities Act of 1933, receiverships
ancillary to SEC actions against brokers or broker-dealers should not be continued, in
a case involving insolvency, beyond the point necessary
to get the estate into the
78
proper forum for liquidation-the bankruptcy court.

In Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC, 79 an
action was brought to restrain violations of federal securities legislation
and to have a receiver appointed for the corporate defendants. After
holding that it had authority to appoint the receiver to take over the
assets "in order that they might not be dissipated, or wasted, and so
that the status quo may be maintained,"8 0 the court considered the
propriety of ordering the receiver to liquidate the respective corporate
defendants:
We are referred to no authority which authorizes the court to require. . . liquidation
.when there has been no bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee in bankruptcy is the
person to liquidate, if that be necessary, under the usual and ordinary supervision of a
Referee in Bankruptcy.
The trial court has found insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, but there is no
apparent reason here why the violation of the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act should lead to a different type of final liquidation than that which is had
for the normal corporate bankrupt. In true bankruptcy, procedures are better geared
for creditors and depositors to give them a day in court and protect their rights. Also,
the Bankruptcy Act . . . has provisions for reorganization.

In our judgment the receiver here should be regarded as one pendente lite ...
It is appreciated that the conservator type of receivership which we have insisted
upon is not well adapted to a business the very essence of which is promotion and,
apparently, depends on a constant inflow of new business. However, a receiver does
seem required. But, we are not yet willing to order liquidation. . . .We do not hold
that liquidation can not ever be effected. Possibly some circumstances might arise
which would justify such a result. And, it could even eventuate in this case, but we
8 l
hold "not now."
77.

350 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1965).

78.

Id. at 63 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).

79.

285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).

80.
81.

Id. at 181.
Id. at 182 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted). See also SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360

F.2d 741, 750-51 (2d Cir. 1966).
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While the Los Angeles Trust court stated that it had been referred to
no decisions which authorized liquidation, it did not hold that the
power does not exist. Nonetheless, in view of the availability of
bankruptcy proceedings, the court was concerned with the propriety of
exercising that power.
In Esbitt v. Dutch-American Mercantile Corp., 82 the Second Circuit
also questioned the use of an equity receivership to perform the
functions of the bankruptcy court.
The record plainly indicates that the First Discount Corporation is hopelessly insolvent
and is in the process (almost completed) of liquidation. We see no reason why violation
of the Securities Act should result in the liquidation of an insolvent corporation via an
equity receivership instead of the normal bankruptcy procedures, which are much
better designed to protect the rights of interested parties. . . . Were it not for this
court's decision in ManhattanRubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey Mfg. Co., ... from which we
are reluctant to depart without full briefing, though it may possibly be distinguishable,
we should feel compelled on our own motion to direct the District Court to order the
filing of a bankruptcy petition. However, the receivership has progressed almost to
completion without objection and it would apparently not be in the interests of the
3
parties to direct that further proceedings be diverted into bankruptcy channels.8

However, while the Second Circuit did allow the receiver to liquidate,
its language once again points out its concern with the propriety of
exercising that power.
In Manhattan Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. Lucey Manufacturing
Co., 84 upon which Esbitt relied, the Second Circuit reversed an order
commanding the directors of the defendant corporation to file a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy, or to admit in writing the
corporation's inability to pay its debts and its willingness to be
adjudged a bankrupt. The court noted that unless there is a ground for
an involuntary bankruptcy,
[n]o solvent corporation can be adjudged a bankrupt without its consent. It must be a
voluntary act of the board of directors, or a creditor may show the commission of an
act of bankruptcy.8

The conflict regarding whether bankruptcy or equity receivership is
the proper vehicle for liquidation has become more apparent in recent
decisions involving SEC enforcement actions. In SEC v. Arkansas
Loan & Thrift Corp., 86 the SEC petitioned for an injunction against a
82. 335 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1964).
83. Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
84. 5 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1925).
85. Id. at 42. Although there may be no power to compel the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, the SEC has required, as a condition to the acceptance of a consent injunction, the
filing of a petition under Chapter X for a reorganization. See SEC v. Oil Field Drilling Corp.,
SEC Lit. Release No. 4577 (April 1, 1970).
86. 294 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Ark. 1969), aff'd sub nor. SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475 (8th
Cir. 1970).
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corporation which allegedly had used fraudulent means to sell securities. The defendant directors and officers of the corporation moved
for transfer of the proceedings to bankruptcy. Rejecting the motion on
the dual grounds that much work had been done by the receiver for
the benefit of the creditors, and that it would not be in the interests of
the creditors to divert further proceedings into bankruptcy channels,
the court stated:
The Receiver has been successful in many of his efforts notwithstanding the attitude
of the directors and trustees. Thirteen suits have been filed by the Receiver to foreclose
mortgages and to obtain judgments against some, if not at [sic] all, of the movants.
... Volumes could be written about the work that has been done by the Receiver for
the benefit of the creditors, but space forbids the enumeration or even attempted
enumeration of all the actions taken by him. To say the least, his task has not been
87
any easy one.

By allowing the liquidation to continue, the court impliedly recognized
its power to order liquidation. The order was affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit in 1970 in an opinion which recognized the power of the court
to order liquidation and noted that "[w]hether it is appropriate to do so
'8 8
depends on the underlying circumstances.
In Blair & Co. v. Foley, 89 Blair & Co. was a brokerage house and a
member of the New York Stock Exchange. Because of operating
losses, Blair & Co. entered into an agreement with the Exchange
pursuant to which trustees of the Exchange's Special Trust Fund
would make loans and guarantees to assist Blair & Co.'s customers
against loss. In return, the Exchange had the right to appoint a
liquidator of its own choosing. After the trustee had been appointed by
the Exchange, holders of subordinated debentures of Blair & Co. filed
an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against the financially troubled
corporation. On cross-motions for summary judgment the referee in
bankruptcy held that the appointment of the trustee constituted the
fifth act of bankruptcy.90 On appeal, the court held that the
Exchange-appointed liquidator was not the type of trustee or receiver
contemplated by the fifth act of bankruptcy because: (i) he was not
appointed by a court, (ii) he did not have legal title to the property,
and, (iii) most importantly, the appointment of the trustee did not
87. Id. at 1247.
88. SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 1970).
89. 471 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 212 (1973), dismissed as
moot, 495 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1974).

90. "Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having.., while insolvent or unable
to pay his debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the
appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of his property ....
(1970).

'"

11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5)
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prevent creditors from continuing to pursue the assets as is normally
the case when a court appoints a trustee or receiver. 9 1
In SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc., 9 2 a receiver was appointed because
of the corporation's improper maintenance of records and its questionable business practices. Under the terms of the appointment, the
receiver was to serve until such time as the Securities Investor Protec93
tion Corporation could determine whether to install its own trustee.
The order appointing the receiver authorized him to liquidate only "if
necessary. ' 94 On appeal, the defendants attacked both the initial
appointment of the receiver and the subsequent appointment of the
SIPC trustee. Upholding the appointment of the receiver, the court
noted that the case did not involve a situation "where the only purpose
of the receivership was to bring about a quick liquidation.'" 95 Therefore, the court approved the appointment of the receiver on the basis
that the appointment was necessary to install promptly "a responsible
officer of the court who could . . . 'ascertain the true state of affairs
. . . report thereon to the court' . . . and preserve the corporate
assets ' 9 6 prior to the appointment of any SIPC trustee.
In In re Nafalin & Co., 97 an equity receiver had been appointed in
an action commenced by the SEC. Thereafter, and within four months
of the appointment of the receiver, creditors petitioned in bankruptcy
citing Naftalin's alleged insolvency at the time the receiver was
appointed as the act of bankruptcy. Naftalin argued that once jurisdiction had been asserted by a federal court under section 27 of the 1934
Act 98 the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction was necessarily precluded.
The district court dismissed the argument, holding that under section
27 jurisdiction could be in either the district court or the bankruptcy
court. The court also determined that its role was to "make an
adjudication of bankruptcy [in which] any concern with the SEC laws
91. 471 F.2d at 181-82. Subsequent to the Second Circuit's decision, Blair & Co. filed under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Thereafter, the bankruptcy court entered an order of
confirmation approving Blair & Co.'s plan for handling claims. See 495 F.2d at 299. Although
certiorari was originally granted, 411 U.S. 930 (1973), the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the matter to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the issue had become moot by reason of
the intervening order of the bankruptcy court 414 U.S. 212 (1973). The Second Circuit dismissed
for mootness. 495 F.2d at 299.
92. 461 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
93. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (1970). See 43

Fordham L. Rev. 136 (1974).
94. 461 F.2d at 978.
95. Id.at 983.
96. Id. (quoting SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 750-51 (2d Cir. 1966)).
97. 315 F. Supp. 463 (D. Minn. 1970).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
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seems quite incidental. The fact that there may be a parallel or
substantially parallel procedure under the SEC laws is irrelevant." 99
Furthermore, the court noted that under section 2(a)(21) of the Bankruptcy Act, 0 0 if the appointment of the equity receiver were made
within four months of the date of bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court
could compel a turnover of the assets by the equity receiver. 10 ' The
court concluded that it should refer the matter to the referee in
bankruptcy for his determination regarding whether the equity rewas insolvent, thus
ceiver had been appointed at a time while Naftalin
10 2
bankruptcy.
of
act
fifth
the
to
rise
giving
In SEC v. Bowler, 103 the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
approval of a plan of reorganization and the denial of the SEC's
request for a receiver and ordered the appointment of a receiver. In so
doing the court noted:
A proceeding under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act would be the most appropriate
and most promising solution for the financial difficulties of the corporate defendants.
Under it the rights of all parties, creditors and investors, could be adequately
protected, and they would have full opportunity to participate and be heard in the
proceedings. But defendants have not seen fit to initiate such a proceeding, and an
until a receiver has been
involuntary petition for reorganization will not lie unless and
10 4
appointed or an act of bankruptcy has been committed.

In In re Colorado Trust Deed Funds, Inc., 10 5 the court affirmed the
dismissal of a Chapter X proceeding where a pending receivership had
resulted from an SEC action. The court determined that in view of the
to protect the
pending receivership, Chapter X was not 0necessary
6
interests of the creditors and stockholders.1
The above cases indicate both the conflict between equity receivership and bankruptcy and the courts' hesitancy to exercise their power
to liquidate under an equity receivership. Several factors should be
pointed out. The cases deal not with the power of the court but with
the propriety of exercising that power. While Lankenau points to Los
'1 7
Angeles Trust as having "held [the power] to be almost nonexistent, ) 0
99. 315 F. Supp. at 468.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(21) (1970).
101. 315 F. Supp. at 468.
102. Id. at 471. See note 90 supra.
103. 427 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1970).
104. Id. at 196. See 11 U.S.C. § 531 (1970).
105. 311 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1962).
106. Id. at 290 (citing Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S.
78 (1942)). Chapter X contains a provision which permits dismissal of a petition if "a prior
proceeding is pending in any court and it appears that the interests of creditors and stockholders
would be best subserved in such prior proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 546(4) (1970).
107. 350 F.2d at 63.

1974]

SEC RECEIVERSHIPS

this is both a contradiction in terms and an incorrect reading of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion. Los Angeles said only that "[w]e are referred to
no authority which authorizes the court to require . . . liquidation,"
and later indicated that some circumstances might exist which would
"justify" liquidation. 10 8 Indeed in Esbitt the court acknowledged that
power when it confined its discussion to the propriety of allowing
liquidation to continue. 10 9 Lankenau itself does no more than to state:
[R]eceiverships ancillary to SEC actions against brokers or broker-dealers should not
be continued, in a case involving insolvency, beyond the point necessary to get the
estate into the proper forum for liquidation-the bankruptcy court."10

The courts' hesitancy is most evident when insolvency is a factor in
the cases. Where the company is insolvent, by definition, creditors will
not be fully satisfied and, a fortiori, neither will stockholders. Thus, in
order to protect their rights and to ensure an equitable distribution,
established bankruptcy procedures may be more suitable than receivership. Where however, the corporation is solvent, all of the creditors
can be paid, and there is less possibility of inequity. Nevertheless, in
113
cases such as Arkansas Loan, I1 Esbitt, 112 and Colorado Trust,
where insolvency is present, the courts have allowed the receiver to
continue the receivership and liquidate where much had already been
accomplished for the benefit of the shareholders and creditors, and it
would not have been in their interest to divert further proceedings into
114
bankruptcy channels.
Finally, ManhattanRubber, IIs Blair 16 and Bowler1 17 indicate that
no corporation can be forced into bankruptcy without having committed an act of bankruptcy. Of course under Blair, the court appointment of a receiver for an insolvent corporation would be an act of
bankruptcy. 1 18 Synthesizing the cases, a rule emerges that liquida108. 285 F.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
109. 335 F.2d at 143.
110. 350 F.2d at 63 (emphasis added).
111. 294 F. Supp. at 1236.
112. 335 F.2d at 143.
113. 311 F.2d at 289.
114. In SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 n.28 (2d Cir. 1972), the
court noted that a conflict had arisen between the equity receiver and a receiver appointed
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act. Although the equity receiver at first disputed a ruling by the
bankruptcy court giving priority to the bankruptcy receiver, a compromise was reached between
the bankruptcy receiver and the equity receiver. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 71
Civ. 3627 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1971) (stipulation).
115. 5 F.2d at 42.
116. 471 F.2d at 184.
117. 427 F.2d at 196.
118. 471 F.2d at 181-82.
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tion in bankruptcy rather than through receivership should occur
where (i) the corporation is insolvent at the time the receiver is
appointed, (ii) an involuntary petition in bankruptcy has been filed by
a creditor, or a voluntary petition has been filed by the corporation, 19
and (iii) the receivership has not advanced to the point where bankruptcy would duplicate the receiver's efforts. 120 In the case of the
appointment of a receiver of a solvent corporation, however, since the
mere appointment of a receiver would not constitute an act of bankruptcy, the receiver, under appropriate circumstances, should be free
to liquidate. 121 Wherever possible, the receiver should make reference
to the bankruptcy laws to insure an equitable distribution of the
liquidated assets. 12 2 After liquidation any monies owing to unlocated
shareholders should be deposited and held in court. 123 Unclaimed
monies owing to unlocated shareholders should not be disbursed to the
other shareholders since to do so would cut off their 12rights as
shareholders, 1 24 and effect a dissolution of their interests.

119. The filing of a "voluntary" petition by the receiver without consent of the board of the
corporation would be improper since the receiver's very existence is involuntary. Cf. SEC v.
Bowler, 427 F.2d 190, 196 (4th Cir. 1970); Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey Mfg. Co., 5
F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1925).
120. Since the Bankruptcy Act requires that an involuntary petition be filed within four
months of the receiver's appointment, the probability is that within those four months the
receivership would not have advanced to a point where bankruptcy would be duplicative. See I
Collier §§ 3.506, 3.706. See also 11 U.S.C. § 546(4) (1970). For a discussion of when the
appointment of a receiver constitutes an act of bankruptcy, see Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 881
(1973).
121. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey Mfg. Co., 5 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1925); SEC v.
Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D. Del. 1943); SEC v. Fleetwood Sec. Corp. of
America, 64 Civ. 1379 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 28, 1971). Of course, other acts of bankruptcy may
have occurred which would result in the filing of an involuntary petition. See also SEC v. S & P
Nat'l Corp., 285 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed at note 196 infra and accompanying
text, where as a result of a vote of shareholders a plan of liquidation and dissolution of a solvent
corporation was approved.
122. See SEC v. First Sec. Co., 366 F. Supp. 367, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
123. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041-42 (1970). See SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 285 F. Supp. 415, 417
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); SEC v. Fleetwood Sec. Corp. of America, 64 Civ. 1379 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan.
28, 1971); cf. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
124. In SEC v. Fleetwood Sec. Corp. of America, 64 Civ. 1379 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 10,
1973), shareholders who would have been cut off had their shares of the liquidation been
distributed to others made application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2042 (1970) after the close of the
receivership and received their distribution.
125. But cf. Jacobs v. Tenney, 316 F. Supp. 151, 170 (D. Del. 1970), where it was strongly
implied that the court would subordinate management's stock to publicly held stock. However,
under bankruptcy, missing shareholders could be cut off. See Duebler v. Sherneth Corp., 160
F.2d 472, 473 (2d Cir. 1947); Knapp v. Detroit Leland Hotel Co., 153 F.2d 715, 717 (6th Cir.
1946); Hendrie v. Lowmaster, 152 F.2d 83, 85 (6th Cir. 1945). See also In re Koch, 116 F.2d 243
(2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1941). Shareholders can also be cut off where a specific
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3.

Grounds for Liquidation

Assuming that liquidation is not "an additional penalty" and that
liquidation will not be confined to bankruptcy court in all cases, the
next step is to determine the circumstances which should induce a
court to order liquidation through equity receivership. Since most
1 26
reference is made to
public companies are incorporated in Delaware,
1 27
authority.
federal
to
as
well
as
Delaware
Broadly stated, it has been held by federal and state courts that a
court may order liquidation notwithstanding solvency, when it has
been proved that there has been fraud, gross mismanagement or abuse
of trust by the officers or majority shareholders, abandonment of
corporate functions, or where the object for which the company was
formed has become impossible of attainment.
a.

Delaware

While the Delaware courts do not doubt their power to appoint a
liquidating receiver, they are reluctant to do so where the corporation
is solvent. 128 Accordingly, in Berwald v. Mission Development Co., 129
the court stated:
The extreme relief of receivership to wind up a solvent going business is rarely
granted. To obtain it there must be a showing of imminent danger of great loss
130
resulting from fraud or mismanagement.

In Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Famns, Inc., 13 1 the court echoed
this reluctance, but indicated the instances when it would act:
statute authorizes such interference. See, e.g., The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
15 U.S.C. § 79k(e); In re Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 301 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Del. 1969), aft'd, 433
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1970), and cases cited therein.
126. See H. Henn, Law of Corporations 20, 24-25 (2d ed. 1970).
127. For a discussion of the conflict between federal and state court receivers, see Harkin v.
Brundage, 276 U.S. 36 (1928). See also Golden v. Reiter, 60 Civ. 2124 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), holding
that the appointment of a receiver by a New York state court pursuant to state law regulating
securities did not interfere with federal regulation of securities or federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
and that creditors of the corporate subject would not be prevented from petitioning in bankruptcy. But see SEC v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 378 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1974)
holding that the appointment of a federal receiver for a Texas insurance company was unnecessary despite alleged serious violations of the securities laws because the matter had come under
the control and supervision of the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Texas.
128. See Engstrum v. Paul Engstrum Assoc., 36 Del. Ch. 19, 124 A.2d 722 (1956); Vale v.
Atlantic Coast & Inland Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 50, 99 A.2d 396 (1953); Zuchowski v. Boxwood Coal
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 331, 93 A.2d 119 (1952); Thoroughgood v. Georgetown Water Co., 9 Del. Ch.
84, 77 A. 720 (1910).
129. 40 Del. Ch. 509, 185 A.2d 480 (Sup. CL 1962).
130. Id. at 512, 185 A.2d at 482.
131. 39 Del. Ch. 244, 163 A.2d 288 (Sup. CL 1960).
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Under some circumstances courts of equity will appoint liquidating receivers for
solvent corporations, but the power to do so is always exercised with great restraint
and only upon a showing of gross mismanagement, positive misconduct by the

corporate officers, breach of trust, or extreme circumstances showing imminent danger
of great loss to the corporation .... 132

As a result of these stringent requirements, there are few Delaware
cases in which such relief has been granted. Indeed, one court noted
that "[lthe cases directly in point are not numerous, but there are
many judicial statements which recognize that rule"' 133 with respect
to the court's power to liquidate.
One case in which the conduct of the chief executive and principal
shareholder was such as to necessitate the appointment of a liquidating
receiver is Tansey v. Oil Producing Royalties, Inc. 134 There, the
defendant was charged with fraud and mismanagement in making
loans to the company at high interest rates and for no apparent
purpose other than to obtain continuing interest payments for his
personal use, in using the company's funds to make loans to others
without receiving security and without the approval of the other
officers and directors, and in using the company's funds for investment
in other enterprises dominated by him. The purpose of the company
was to purchase and retain oil royalties but with one minor exception,
none had been purchased since 1930. No meetings of officers or
directors had been held since 1932 and officers had been changed
without election by directors. No financial statements were ever issued. The defendant also testified that he had no intention of continuing the business of the company. Deciding to appoint a liquidating
receiver, the court stated:
The cumulative effect of the foregoing facts combined with the defendant's attitude
with respect to the rights of preferred stockholders, his advanced age and his "strange"
ideas concerning proper corporate management as evidenced by his actions and
testimony, impel me to conclude, in the exercise of my discretion, that the strong
evidence necessary for the35 appointment of a receiver for a solvent corporation exists
here in ample measure.'

In Berwald v. Mission Development Co., 13 6 and in Warshaw v.
Calhoun,137 where the plaintiffs requested the appointment of liquidating receivers because of apparent acts of mismanagement, the courts
132.

Id. at 248, 163 A.2d at 293. Accord, Drob v. National Memorial Park, Inc., 28 Del. Ch.

254, 41 A.2d 589 (1945).

133.

Lichens Co. v. Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., 28 Del. Ch. 220, 223, 40 A.2d 447,

452 (1944).

134.
135.
136.
137.

36
Id.
40
43

Del. Ch. 472, 133 A.2d 141 (1957).
at 480, 133 A.2d at 147.
Del. Ch. 509, 185 A.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Del. Ch. 148, 221 A.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1966).

SEC RECEIVERSHIPS

1974]

concluded that they could not interfere with the business judgment of
a corporation absent a showing of bad faith or abuse of discretion. The
court in Warshaw remarked that the situation was unfortunate but not
illegal and that the majority had the right to continue the company in
its present form. Concluding, the court stated:
There has been, therefore, no showing of imminent loss to Securities [the company]
flowing from fraudulent or illegal action on the part of the majority stockholders or the
directors. Such being the case, a receiver may not be appointed to liquidate
38

Securities.1

On the other hand, in Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 139 the
court refused to order liquidation where acts of mismanagement had
occurred but there was no insolvency. Thus, while it is evident that
where conduct resembles that of the defendant in the Tansey case
liquidation will be ordered, it will not be ordered where there is merely
apprehension of future misconduct,' 40 or where, though near insolvency as a result of mismanagement it appears that no fraud was
involved.
b.

Federal

Although requiring the same egregious conduct on the part of
management, the federal courts have shown a more lenient attitude
toward a request for the appointment of a liquidating receiver than the
courts of Delaware, particularly when the request is made by the SEC.
In Aldred Investment Trust v. SEC,14 1 the court found that the
trustees of a Massachusetts business trust had liquidated 30 percent of
the trust assets, selling some shares below market price, in order to
acquire cash for their personal acquisition of a horse racing association. For this affirmative misconduct, the court appointed a receiver
42
with the power either to reorganize or liquidate the insolvent trust.1
After several plans of reorganization were rejected, the court ordered
liquidation. 143
The Aldred Investment Trust liquidation order was affirmed two
years later in Bailey v. Proctor.144 During the period of the receiver138.
139.

Id. at 156, 221 A.2d at 491.
257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).

140. See 16 Fletcher § 7724. In Lichens the court set forth the circumstances which would
cause it to act (i.e., positive misconduct, breach of trust, etc.) adding that such relief would be
granted "probably, except in rare cases, only when insolvency has resulted from such misconduct" 28 Del. Ch. at 223, 40 A.2d at 451.
141. 58 F. Supp. 724 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
795 (1946).
142.

Id. at 733.

143.
144.

See Bailey v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 834 (1947).
Id. See 60 Harv. L. Rev. 816 (1947).
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ship the trust had become solvent as the result of an appreciation in
value of certain securities. In answer to the appellant's contention that
the solvency deprived the court of jurisdiction, the court refused to
rescind its order of liquidation, stating:
[A] court of equity has inherent power to appoint a receiver to liquidate a corporation

or investment trust where fraud, mismanagement or abuse of trust is present whether
or not insolvency is likewise present ...
been present, the
• . . Other grounds for the appointment of a receiver having 145
court's jurisdiction is not defeated by the supervening solvency.

In Campbell v. PennsylvaniaIndustries, Inc., 14 6 the court added the
element of "deadlock between contending factions seeking to control
and manage a corporation"' 14 7 to the list of instances when a liquidating receiver may be appointed, and enumerated the other common
circumstances as
abandonment of corporate functions, failure of corporate purposes, and gross fraud
and mismanagement on the part of directors and controlling stockholders involving a
breach on their part of the fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty owed to minority
stockholders. 148

Nevertheless, the court in Campbell refused to appoint a liquidating
receiver despite the probability of an abuse of trust by the directors,
because there was no present, imminent danger of serious loss to the
stockholders. Adhering to the Delaware decisions on this point, it
condition precedent
added that such danger "appears to be a necessary
49
to the exercise of such drastic powers."'
Ten years later in Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 150 the appointment of a liquidating receiver was held justified where there existed
a pattern of conduct by the dominant stockholders, and a disposition on their part to

continue the pattern, which was seriously prejudicial to the rights and interests of the
minority . . . [and where] there was no readily available market for the stock of the
minority. 151

Bellevue Gardens involved two close corporations with interlocking
directorships. The assets of one corporation were siphoned off into the
other which was owned by one of the directors, unduly depressing the
market value of the minority's stock.' 5 2 Significantly, the court
145.

160 F.2d at 81-82 (citations omitted). Although the plan was modified by a subsequent

proceeding, Bailey v. Proctor, 166 F.2d 392 (1st Cir. 1948), the modification took other factors
into account.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

99 F. Supp. 199 (D. Del. 1951).
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 206 (footnote omitted).
297 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J.).
Id. at 187.
See Hill v. Bellevue Gardens, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 760, 769-70 (D.D.C. 1960).
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sounded the oft-mentioned, but seldom followed, principle that a
liquidating receiver may be appointed where "abuse of trust is present
53
whether or not insolvency is likewise presentL
An example of egregious conduct coming at the outset of the
corporate venture was presented by SEC v. Arkansas Loan & Thrift
Corp., 154 where the proceeds from a fraudulent sale of securities were
used to benefit the management rather than the investors, contrary to
representations made by management at the time of the sale. Noting
that "[s]uch conduct definitely constitutes mismanagement and abuse
of trust,"15 5 the court justified the appointment of a liquidating receiver
over the insolvent corporation. Similarly, in SEC v. Glf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 15 6 liquidation of related corporations was ordered where securities had been sold in violation of the federal
securities acts and, inter alia, no competent management was available to conduct the business and affairs of the corporations. 1 57
Moreover, in SEC v. Gray Line Corp.,1 58 liquidation of a public
corporation was ordered where, as a result of the consummation of an
agreement carried out by the receiver, the corporation had no assets
other than cash.15 9
A possible exception to the egregious conduct requirement of the
federal courts occurs in the case of an insolvent broker-dealer.1 60 In
this situation, the federal courts have, despite the language in Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks 6 1 referred to previously, 1 62 required little
beyond a showing of insolvency. However, since it has been held
153.

297 F.2d at 187 (quoting Bailey v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78, 81 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 331

U.S. 834 (1947)).
154. 294 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Ark. 1969), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475 (8th
Cir. 1970).
155. Id. at 1244.
156. 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963).

157.

See also SEC v. Bennett & Co., 207 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1962). In SEC v. S & P Nat!

Corp., 285 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a plan of liquidation and dissolution was proposed to

be voted upon by shareholders where there had been violations of both the 1934 Act and the 1940
Act (including failure to file required financial reports with the SEC), no shareholder meeting had
been held for eleven years, the corporations were not conducting any substantial business and
there was a possibility of further injury from attempts by the wrongdoers to dissolve the
corporation. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had previously expressed its hesitancy
about permitting the receiver to liquidate. See SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 750 (2d
Cir. 1966). However, in S & P the liquidation was contingent upon shareholder approval; thus it
was less objectionable.
158. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,426 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
159. See also SEC v. Abrams, SEC Lit. Release No. 4611 (May 22, 1970) (violations of the
1933 Act, 1934 Act and 1940 Act).
160. See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1508-10 nn.105 & 106 (2d ed. 1961)

[hereinafter cited as Loss] and cases cited therein.
161.
162.

350 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1965).
See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
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under the "shingle theory" that by holding itself open for business a
broker-dealer impliedly warrants its solvency 16 3 and because insolvency results in a violation of the SEC's net capital rule164 -thereby
frustrating the lawful realization of a broker-dealer's165 corporate
purpose-there is at least impliedly fraudulent conduct.
In summary, therefore, as a condition to liquidation, aside from the
situation of the insolvent broker-dealer, both federal and state courts
require the existence of fraud, misconduct, or abuse of trust which
results in either (i) the incapacity of the corporation to carry on its
business, (ii) imminent danger to the stockholders from the continuation of the corporation or (iii) abandonment of the corporate
purpose.1 66 When these strict requirements are added to the other
limitations upon the court's ordering liquidation by a receiver, there
will be few cases in which liquidation will be an appropriate remedy.
C. Dissolution
The power of a federal court to dissolve rather than merely liquidate
a state chartered corporation presents a more esoteric question. Because of the availability and effectiveness of other remedies, 167 and
perhaps because of the convoluted jurisdictional problems raised, few
federal courts have ruled on the question. For this reason, the viability
of dissolution as a remedy for a federal receiver remains unclear.
The threshold problem is jurisdictional. A fundamental precept of
corporation law is that a corporation is an artificial being created by a
state. 168 It follows that "the state ... which grants the corporation its
franchise . . . has exclusive and supreme power to withdraw it and to
forfeit the corporate charter or dissolve the corporation."', 69 Relying on
163. See, e.g., 3 Loss 1482-1500, 1508.
164. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1974).
165. In some cases involving insolvent broker-dealers, the SEC agrees to liquidation in lieu of
the appointment of a receiver. See, e.g., SEC v. Lowell, Murphy & Co., SEC Lit. Release No.
2127 (October 20, 1961); SEC v. Miller & Edwards, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 3171 (March 10,
1965).
166. See generally 3 Loss 1508-14; 6 id. at 3728-34 (Supp. 1969); 60 Harv. L. Rev. 816 (1947).
167. "The formal cancellation of the franchise to operate granted to the corporation by the
state is not necessary in the usual case to the carrying out of the functions of receivership by the
courts." Smith v. Aeolian Co., 53 F. Supp. 636, 638 (D. Conn. 1943). A federal court may avoid
the question by directing the receiver to seek dissolution in the proper state court (see Part 111(C)
infra) or by ordering a shareholders' meeting for the purpose of voting on a plan of reorganization
which would result in dissolution. See SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 273 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Part I1(D) infra.
168. "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, amd existing only in contemplation of law." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819).
169. 17 Fletcher § 8579, at 931 and cases cited. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b), which provides in
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this principle, state 170 and federal courts 17' have consistently refused
to dissolve foreign corporations. Actions to dissolve domestic corporations have proved more troublesome.
A corollary of the principle that the corporation is created by the
state is that "a court of equity has no power . . . to decree the
dissolution of a domestic corporation . . . unless such extraordinary
72
power has been conferred upon it by the terms of some statute.'
Although this rule applies to state courts as well as to federal courts of
equity, 173 most states have enacted statutes which permit an action for
dissolution to be maintained in state court under specified
circumstances. 174 A well established rule of federal practice states:

[I]f a state legislature, by a valid law, create a right essentially equitable in its nature,
prescribing a remedy for its enforcement substantially consistent with the ordinary
modes of proceeding on the chancery side of the federal courts, no reason exists why it
should not
be pursued in a federal court of equity in the same form as it is in the state
175
courts.

pertinent part: "The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law
under which it was organized."
170. The New York cases are illustrative. In Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370,
373 (N.Y. 1820), the chancellor refused to consider whether a Pennsylvania corporation should
forfeit its charter for acting ultra vires. Similarly in Barclay v. Talman, 4 Edw. Ch. 123 (N.Y.
1842), aff'd, 4 Edw. Ch. 131 n. (N.Y. 1843), the court denied jurisdiction to dissolve a Maryland
bank which had transferred all its assets, stating. "Although a denizen of this State, this
corporation is foreign and alien to our laws and over which, for the purpose of dissolving it and
winding up its affairs, the courts of this State can have no jurisdiction." Id. at 130. Later cases
are in accord. See, e.g., Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N.Y. 563, 572, 35 N.E. 932, 936 (1894);
Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N.Y. 208, 222 (1866); Horton v. Thomas McNally Co., 155 App.
Div. 322, 330, 140 N.Y.S. 357, 363 (2d Dep't 1913); Miller v. Barlow, 88 App. Div. 529, 533-34,
85 N.Y.S. 310, 313-14 (Ist Dep't 1903), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Miller v. Quincy, 179
N.Y. 294, 72 N.E. 116 (1904); Henry Dreyfuss & Co. v. Charles Seale & Co., 18 Misc. 551, 552,
41 N.Y.S. 875, 876 (Sup. Ct 1896), rev'd on other grounds, 37 App. Div. 351, 55 N.Y.S. 1111
(1st Dep't 1899). For other state cases supporting this view, see AnnoL, 19 A.L.RI3d 1279 (1968).
171. See, e.g., Quinn v. Jaloff, 71 F.2d 707, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1934); Ward v. Foulkrod, 264
F. 627, 634 (3d Cir. 1920); Maguire v. Mortgage Co. of America, 203 F. 858, 859 (2d Cir. 1913);
Republican Mt. Silver Mines, Ltd. v. Brown, 58 F. 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1893); Carson v. Allegany
Window Glass Co., 189 F. 791, 796 (C.C.D. Del. 1911); Sellman v. German Union Fire Ins. Co.,
184 F. 977, 978 (C.C.D. Del. 1909); Parks v. United States Bankers' Corp., 140 F. 160
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905); 3 Clark § 755.
172. Republican Mt. Silver Mines, Ltd. v. Brown, 58 F. 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1893).
173. Clark characterizes this rule as "unanimous." 3 Clark § 802.1, at 1454. See cases
collected id. at n.688. Recent state cases, however, have suggested that the power to dissolve may
be inherent in a court of equity. See, e.g., Liebert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247
N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963); Lavant v. Kowal, 350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336 (1957), noted in 36 Texas
L. Rev. 660 (1958).
174. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 1101-17 (McKinney 1963); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 283 (1968).
175. Land Title & Trust Co. v. Asphalt Co. of America, 127 F. 1, 18 (3d Cir. 1903). Accord,
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 500 (1923); Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 24

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Since there is no inherent federal equity power to dissolve a creature of
the state, 17 6 the question arises whether a particular state dissolution
statute creates a substantive right which can be enforced in a federal
court.
In Conklin v. United States Shipbuilding Co., 177 a federal receiver
seeking to dissolve a New Jersey corporation in the federal court for
the district of New Jersey invoked a statute which provided for
dissolution in the discretion of the New Jersey Court of Chancery. 178
Rejecting the argument that the statute empowered a federal equity
court to dissolve, the court stated:
It does not seem to me that section 69 of the New Jersey act, which ... authorizes the
New Jersey Court of Chancery to make a decree dissolving an insolvent corporation
and declaring its charter forfeited and void, creates any right enforceable in a federal
court. The corporation is the creature of the state. It derives its life from the state. It
possesses the powers conferred by the state. The period of its existence is determined
solely by the will of the state, and the state has conferred upon her Court of Chancery
alone the power to act as its executioner.1 79

On the other hand, in Smith v. Aeolian Co., 180 the court considered
a Connecticut statute which gave to the holders of ten percent of the
shares of stock in a corporation the right to wind up and dissolve the
corporation.' 81 Construing the statutory designation of the Connecticut Superior Court as an effort to "[establish] the venue of such
actions within the state judicial system rather than an effort to confine
(1884); Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817, 828 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 675 (1933).
176. Grocery Supply, Inc. v. McKinley Park Services, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Alas.
1955) ("But in the absence of statute, equity does not have the power to destroy that which tile
state has created ....
"). See also notes 170 & 171 supra and accompanying text.
177. 140 F. 219 (C.C.D.N.J. 1905).
178. N.J. Gen. Corp. Act of 1896, Ch. 185, § 69, [1896] Laws of N.J. 300, provided in
pertinent part: "[Tlhe court of chancery may, in its discretion .. , direct the receiver to reconvey
to the corporation all its property. . . and in every case in which the court of chancery shall not
direct such reconveyance, said court may, in its discretion, make a decree dissolving the
corporation and declaring its charter forfeited and void."
179. 140 F. at 222. Accord, Hirsch v. Independent Steel Co. of America, 196 F. 104, 109
(C.C.S.D. W.Va. 1911), appeal dismissed sub nom. Hirsch v. Taylor, 225 U.S. 698 (1912) (West
Virginia dissolution statute did not create right enforceable in federal court); Gaylord v. Fort
Wayne M. & C. R.R., 10 F. Cas. 121 (No. 5,284) (C.C.D. Ind. 1875) (Indiana dissolution statute
did not create right enforceable in federal court).
180. 53 F. Supp. 636 (D. Conn. 1943).
181. Law of Sept. 18, 1930, § 3467, Conn. Gen. Stats. (repealed 1959), now Conn. Gen.
Stats. Ann. §§ 33-383, -385 (1960). The statute provided in pertinent part: "[W]henever any good
and sufficient reason exists for the dissolution of such corporation, any stockholder or stockholders owning not less than one-tenth of its capital stock may apply to the superior court in the
county wherein such corporation is located for the dissolution of such corporation and the
appointment of a receiver to wind up its affairs."
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such actions to the state rather than the federal courts," 8 2 the court
distinguished earlier cases and, holding that the Connecticut statute
conferred a substantive right, stated:
If the right to dissolution and distribution of the assets is substantive within the
meaning of the Pusey & Jones case, and if the machinery of the court is adapted to the
carrying out of the method of relief granted to shareholders through the state courts by
the statute, there appears to be no compelling
reason for the federal court to refuse
83
relief in an action under the statute.1

In Belcher v. Birmingham Trust NationalBank, 184 the trustee of an
inter vivos trust sought the dissolution of an Alabama corporation in
federal district court. The Alabama Corporation Law,' 8 5 which was
patterned after section 90 of the Model Business Corporation Act,' 86
permitted dissolution in a number of circumstances. Although apparently no direct attack was made on the federal court's power to
implement the Alabama statute, the court opined:
[Slection 21(78) [of the Alabama Corporation Law] modified and liberalized the
existing law and extended the jurisdiction of the court to liquidate and dissolve a
corporation. Guided by equitable considerations and the applicable principles of law,
the ultimate8 7decision remains one for the trial court based upon the particular facts of
1
each case.

Although the Belcher court decided not to dissolve the corporation,
but instead ordered a semi-liquidation, it is clear that it believed it had
the power to do so since it reserved jurisdiction to order dissolution in
the event that its order of semi-liquidation could not be effectuated. ' 88
Nevertheless, the court cited no authority for its power to order
182. 53 F. Supp. at 639.
183. Id. In Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923), to which the court referred,
the Supreme Court distinguished between "substantive" equitable rights and those equitable
rights which were merely "remedial." A remedial right conferred upon the chancellor a new
power and thus could not be enforced in federal courts. Id. at 500. It has been suggested that the
Erie doctrine has undermined this distinction. See, e.g., Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright & Co., 263
F.2d 823, 825 (3d Cir. 1959) ("Today ... it is likely that the Delaware statute involved in the
Pusey & Jones case would be regarded as supplying a substantive right which the federal courts
in a diversity action would recognize."); Pasos v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271, 272 (2d
Cir. 1956); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 195 F. Supp. 47, 52 n.24 (S.D.N.Y.),
vacated on other grounds, 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962); Note,
The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine: Past and Present, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 836 (1954).
184. 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
185. Ala. Code tit. 10, § 21(78) (1973 Supp.), provides that a corporation can be dissolved.
"(a) In an action by a stockholder when it is established: . . . (2) That the acts of the directors or
those in control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; or (3) That the corporate
assets are being misapplied or wasted.
186. 348 F. Supp. at 147 n.19.
187. Id. at 148.
188. Id. at 153.
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dissolution but merely assumed it from the breadth of the Alabama
statute.
Assuming, therefore, the existence of a broad state statute which
does not limit the power to issue a decree of dissolution to a particular
state tribunal, and which would give the federal receiver standing to
request dissolution, 189 the power exists, at least in theory, for the
issuance of a decree of dissolution by a federal court. There would
appear to be at least three reasons, however, why a federal court
should not order dissolution in an action commenced by the SEC
absent a vote of the shareholders. First, as in Belcher, the use of
liquidation, a less drastic remedy, should afford all the relief necessary. Second, at least with respect to a foreign corporation, forum non
conveniens would seem to require denial of the relief.' 90 Finally,
because under most state statutes dissolution is not complete until
certain action is taken by a state official,' 9 1 the power to dissolve even
a domestic corporation would be subject to veto by an official not
before the court. The possibility that the state official might refuse to
enter the decree' 92 raises the undesirable specter of a federal court
189. It could be argued that the receiver has the same standing as a shareholder or director.
See notes 198-204 infra and accompanying text.
190. State courts typically have invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens to avoid
interfering with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. See, e.g., Langfeldcr v. Universal
Laboratories, Inc., 293 N.Y. 200, 56 N.E.2d 550 (1944); Cohn v. Mishkoff Costello Co., 256
N.Y. 102, 175 N.E. 529 (1931) (per curiam). In Mook v. Berger, 26 App. Div. 2d 925, 274
N.Y.S.2d 855 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam), the court dismissed an action where the plaintiff
sought a direction that the defendant perform certain acts which would cause a foreign
corporation to be dissolved, stating: "Discretion, convenience and expedience, as well as the
settled policy of the State in matters of this nature which go 'to the very heart of the corporation's
affairs' . . . and indeed would terminate its very existence, warrant rejection of the suit and
dismissal of the action herein." Id., 274 N.Y.S.2d at 856 (citation omitted).
Federal courts occasionally have refused to dissolve a foreign corporation on the basis of state
forum non conveniens law. See Smith v. Fitzsimmons, 264 F. Supp. 728, 732 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), affd sub nom. Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394 F.2d 381 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
939 (1968); Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 1945).
191. E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1111(d) (McKinney 1963), which provides: "The clerk of
the court or such other person as the court may direct shall transmit certified copies of the
judgment or final order of dissolution to the department of state and to the clerk of the county In
which the office of the corporation was located at the date of the judgment or order. Upon filing
by the department of state, the corporation shall be dissolved."
192. The Attorney General of Delaware has stated that a Delaware corporation cannot be
dissolved or its charter forfeited by a decree or judgment of any court except the Delaware Court
of Chancery and thus that the Secretary of State should refuse to file a decree of the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware which ordered dissolution. Op. [Del.] Att'y Gen. (Jan.
13, 1944).

State courts have refused to honor purported decrees of dissolution entered by foreign courts.
See, e.g., Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924), in which, with
respect to Russia's nationalization of the assets of a New York corporation, Chief Judge Cardozo
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issuing either an ineffective remedy or a writ of mandamus to a state
official. Given these problems, it would appear that dissolution without shareholder approval should seldom, if ever, be ordered by a
federal court in an SEC proceeding. Liquidation, or the remedies
discussed hereinafter, should provide all the relief necessary.
D.

The Power to Call a Shareholders' Meeting

Federal cases indicate that the receiver of a corporation may call a
meeting of shareholders. 193 In SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines,
Inc.,1 94 a receiver had been appointed to manage the affairs of a
company allegedly mismanaged by those formerly in control. At the
time of the receiver's appointment, it was contemplated that a
shareholder's meeting would be held in the near future since none had
been held during the previous two years. When the receiver moved for
an order authorizing the calling of the meeting, the court concluded
that plans for the meeting should proceed, ordering that a large block
of stock of uncertain status not be allowed to vote, and stated: "It is
high time that the other stockholders of Fifth have an opportunity
which they have not had in some years to elect a board of
directors." 195
In SEC v. S & P National Corp., 1 96 the SEC alleged that corporate
defendants had acted as an investment company in violation of the
1940 Act and had committed various violations of the 1934 Act.
During the course of the litigation, settlement discussions ensued,
resulting in the proposal of a settlement plan which included, inter
alia, the calling of a shareholders' meeting for the purpose of voting
upon the liquidation and dissolutior of the subject corporation. The
court approved the plan and subsequently the shareholders voted to
1 97
liquidate and dissolve.
In Prickett v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 198 a receiver,
appointed by the federal district court for a corporation which held
stated: "A government of Russia could not terminate its existence either by dissolution or by
merger, for it was a corporation formed under our laws, and its corporate life continued until the
law of its creation declared that it should end." Id. at 167, 145 N.E. at 919 (emphasis deletedi.
193. Cf. fills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), in which the Court ordered the
calling of a new shareholders' meeting for violations of the proxy rules under the 1934 Act. See
generally 2 Loss 969-71.
194. 308 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
195. Id. at 950.
196. 360 F.2d 741, 752 (2d Cir. 1966). See SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972),

where the receiver was empowered to hold a meeting of shareholders. Cf. In re J.P. Linahan,
Inc., 111 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1940).
197. 273 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
198. 251 A.2d 576 (Del. Ch. 1969).
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approximately 57 percent of the voting stock in the defendant corporation, petitioned the Delaware Court of Chancery to convene a stockholders' meeting. 19 9 The defendant argued that the receiver lacked
standing to bring the petition because he was not a stockholder.
Rejecting the argument, the court held that, as a receiver pendente
actions available to a stocklite, the plaintiff was authorized to take
20 0
holder of the defendant corporation.
By way of analogy, it would seem that if the receiver of a stockholding corporation may act as a stockholder (i.e., call a meeting), then the
receiver of a corporation, serving in place of its directors, may act with
the same power as the directors and officers. 20 1 Thus, Fletcher states:
Where the receiver conducts the business of the corporation, he takes the place of tile
202
directors in the management of the corporate affairs ....

Since calling a meeting of shareholders is typically one of the duties of
the directors of a corporation, 20-3 the receiver may call such a meeting.
The calling of a shareholders' meeting is clearly the remedy most
consistent with the policy of the federal securities laws in favoring the
democratization of public companies. The receiver is neither elected by
nor directly accountable to the shareholders. The mere circumstance
that a corporation is in receivership, rather than subject to a board, is
no justification for subjecting the shareholder to further injury by
denying him a voice on major corporate policy decisions which directly
affect him. Whether the appropriate solution be liquidation, dissolution or the commencement of a new life through the election of a new
board of directors, 20 4 a shareholders' meeting, unless unobtainable or
impractical because of limitations of time or amount of funds available
for distribution, 20 5 should be the favored forum for determining the
disposition of the corporate subject.
199. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211 (Supp. 1968), provides in part: "If there be a failure to hold
the annual meeting for a period of thirty days after the date designated therefor, or if no date has
been designated, for a period of thirteen months after the organization of the corporation or after
its last annual meeting, the Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting to be held upon
the application of any stockholder."
200.
201.

251 A.2d at 578.
See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979

(1974). Indeed, the receiver is in control of the corporation to the extent that before a derivative
suit may be commenced, a demand must be made on the receiver, instead of the board of
directors, to commence the action. Id. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
202. 16 Fletcher § 7813, at 412 (footnote omitted).
203. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 602 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
204. The receiver, acting in the place of management, should make appropriate recommendations at the meeting.
205. See, e.g., SEC v. Fleetwood Sec. Corp. of America, 64 Civ. 1379 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct.
19, 1972).
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E.

The Power of the Court to Order the Receiver
to Proceed to the State of Incorporation

Because of the limitations on liquidation and dissolution in the
federal courts and because the calling of a shareholders' meeting may
be either difficult or inappropriate, it is important to consider the
possibility of sending the receiver to the state of incorporation to take
appropriate action. In the case of a domestic corporation, no serious
question arises since the district court has jurisdiction over the receiver
when he acts within the confines of the district. However, where a
foreign corporation is involved, questions arise as to the receiver's
"extraterritorial" power-the power to go outside the district of appointment.
Although receivers fall into several categories, the two principal
types are (i) statutory receivers and (ii) equity receivers. A statutory
receiver is one in whom the assets of the corpus are vested pursuant to
a statute which calls for the receiver's appointment or pursuant to a
conveyance. 20 6 An equity receiver (typically appointed in SEC actions)
inherent equity power of a court rather
is one appointed under the
20 7
than pursuant to statute.
208
The right of an equity receiver to sue or proceed extraterritorially,
was first discussed in the landmark case of Booth v. Clark,2 0 9 where it
was held that a foreign equity receiver had no extraterritorial power to
sue in his own name in a federal court. 21 0 While Booth involved a
receiver appointed by a foreign state, the decision has also been
applied to federally appointed receivers. 21 ' Simply stated, the traditional doctrine is as follows:
[Aln ordinary chancery receiver is a mere arm of the court appointing him...- 1 and is
clothed with no power to exercise his official duties in other jurisdictions '

In other words, the power of a receiver is viewed as coextensive with
206.

1 Clark § 16.

207. Id. § 12.
208. See generally Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 429
(1932); Sabel, Suits by Foreign Receivers, 19 Cornell L.Q. 442 (1934); Comment, The Right of a
Foreign Receiver to Sue in a Federal Court, 7 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 211 (1941).
209.

58 U.S. (17 How.) 321 (1854).

210.

See 1 Clark § 317. A receiver appointed by a state court would be permitted to sue in the

federal district court for that state if his appointment so specified. See D'Angelo v. Petroleos
Mexicanos, 373 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Del. 1974).

211. E.g., Great W. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 198 U.S. 561 (1905); Collins v.
McDonald, 98 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Fowler v. Osgood, 141 F. 20 (8th Cir. 1905).
212.

Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 256-57 (1912).
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that of the jurisdiction of the appointing court. 2 13 The court cannot
2 14
grant to a receiver that which it does not itself have.
Because of the problems created in the federal courts by Booth v.
Clark,21 5 Congress gave receivers control over land or other property
lying within the same circuit as that of the district court.2 1 6 Subse-

quently, legislation 21 7 was enacted which vested the receiver with

"complete jurisdiction and control of all [real, personal or mixed]
property [in the other districts] with the right to take possession
thereof' 21 8 upon his filing of the complaint and order of appointment
in the other district courts. Perhaps most importantly for the purpose
of this Article, the section also gave the receiver capacity to sue in any
district without ancillary appointment. Thus, at present, a receiver
appointed by a federal court can, either in aid of an order of liquida213. It is generally accepted that an equity receiver has no right to sue in a state court other
than the appointing court. See, e.g., Wright v. Phillips, 60 Cal. App. 578, 213 P. 288 (2d Dist.
1923); Howarth v. Angle, 162 N.Y. 179, 56 N.E. 489 (1900); State ex rel. Haavind v. Crabbe,
114 Ohio 504, 151 N.E. 755 (1926); Booker v. Ennis, 86 Pa. Super. 145 (1926); Hardee v.
Wilson, 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S.W. 475 (1914).
Some states, however, permit suit as a matter of comity. E.g., Van Kempen v. Latham, 195
N.C. 389, 394, 142 S.E. 322, 324 (1928): "We must be friendly with other states and nations If we
want other states and nations to be friendly with us." Other state authorities allowing suits by
foreign receivers are as follows: Wright v. Phillips, 60 Cal. App. 578, 213 P. 288 (2d Dist. 1923);
Hallam v. Ashford, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 870, 70 S.W. 197 (Ct. App. 1902); Stevens v. Tilden, 122
Minn. 250, 142 N.W. 315 (1913); Shipman v. Treadwell, 200 N.Y. 472, 93 N.E. 1104 (1911);
Hazlett v. Woodhead, 28 R.I. 452, 67 A. 736 (1907); Hardee v. Wilson, 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S.W.
475 (1914). See also Cohen v. La Vin, 210 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1954). Until recently, Delaware was
not among them and denied authority to sue even as a matter of comity. Stockbridge v.
Beckwith, 6 Del. Ch. 72, 33 A. 620 (1887).
Since Stockbridge is an 1887 case and the trend in the states has been toward comity, it is
possible that it may no longer accurately represent the law of Delaware. See Prickett v. American
Steel & Pump Corp., 251 A.2d 576 (Del. Ch. 1969), where the court held that a receiver
appointed by the United States District Court for the District of Delaware had authority to
proceed with an action requesting the calling of a shareholders' meeting for a Delaware
corporation. See text accompanying notes 198-200 supra. Moreover, if there is a statute which
vests title in the receiver, then a foreign receiver may sue in Delaware. Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 35
Del. 339, 352, 168 A. 87, 92 (1933).
214. See, e.g., Grant v. Leach & Co., 280 U.S. 351, 361-62, modified, 281 U.S. 689 (1930);
Hale v. Allinson, 188 U.S. 56, 68 (1903); First Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 107 F.2d 50, 54 (10th
Cir. 1939); Collins v. McDonald, 98 F.2d 258, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The court could, of course,
order the parties before it to perform certain acts outside the jurisdiction since the parties are
subject to the contempt power of the court. See, e.g., Pouliot v. West India Fruit Co., 283 Mass.
182, 186 N.E. 52 (1933); 1 Clark §§ 71(b), 259(a).
215.
58 U.S. (17 How.) 321 (1854); see note 209 supra and accompanying text.
216. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 56, 36 Stat. 1102.
217. 28 U.S.C. § 754 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 754, 62
Stat. 922).
218. Id.
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tion or any other order, take control of property anywhere in the
2 19
United States and sue in any federal court
In Prickett v. American Steel & Pump Corp.,2 20 a receiver appointed by a federal court was granted standing to commence an
action in the state court. The receiver sought pursuant to Delaware
law to enlist the aid of the chancery court to call a stockholders'
meeting. Although the propriety of the receiver's appointment had not
yet been finally decided in the federal court, the chancery court
nevertheless granted the requested relief and called the shareholders'
meeting. Citing the federal statute22 1 and the broad powers granted to
the receiver by the federal district court, the court stated that "there
222
can be no question about his authority to proceed with this action."
Since the receiver is authorized by statute2 23 to proceed in any
district in which he has made the required filings and in effect the
statute turns the equity receiver into a statutory receiver,2 2 4 it would
appear that the limitations on a federal court's ordering dissolution and
liquidation can be overcome by having the receiver commence an
action in the state of incorporation for relief under the corporation
statute of the state.2 2 5 Any objection to the propriety of the relief
requested can then be litigated in the most proper forum. When the
receiver's power to sue in the state of incorporation is combined with
his power to convene a shareholders' meeting, the limitations discussed
previously with respect to liquidation and dissolution become of
significance only in the situations where a shareholders' meeting would
be either unobtainable or inappropriate.2 2 6
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to review the relevant authorities with
respect to the disposition of corporations in receivership. Although not
219. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), which provides for nationwide service under the 1934 Act.
220. 251 A.2d 576 (Del. Ch. 1969).
221. See text accompanying notes 216-19 supra.
222. 251 A.2d at 578. Although the receiver had been appointed for a corporation which was
a stockholder of the defendant corporation, rather than over the defendant corporation itself, that
distinction is of no significance.
223. 28 U.S.C. § 754 (1970).
224. Compare Stockbridge v. Beckwith, 6 Del. Ch. 72, 33 A. 620 (1887), denying comity to a
foreign chancery receiver, with Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 35 Del. 339, 351-52, 168 A. 87, 92 (1933),
holding that a foreign vested receiver may sue in Delaware.
225. If the subject corporation were foreign, the receiver would first have to file pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 754 (1970) in the federal district court of the state of incorporation.
226. As, for example, where the cost of calling and having the meeting would be overly
expensive as compared with the remaining assets of the corporation. See, e.g., SEC v. Fleetwood
Sec. Corp. of America, 64 Civ. 1379 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 19, 1972).
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expressly discussed, one possibility upon termination of the receivership might be the resumption by the corporation of its business
through the election of a new board of directors. 2 27 The failure to
discuss that possibility is not intended as a deprecation of receivers or
receiverships in the federal courts or of the federal judges who
administer them. Rather, it is a statement of probability. Since no
receiver can be appointed before a minimum level of misconduct or
mismanagement by those in control of the corporation has been
surpassed, most corporations which become the subject of federal
court receiverships have little likelihood of future well-being.
If there is any rule which can be gleaned from the authorities
discussed, it is that federal courts should move cautiously before
taking action which would have the effect, whether pragmatically or
legally, of ending the corporation's existence without shareholder
approval. Thus, wherever possible, the determination as to the plight
of the corporate subject should be made by the public investors. Of
course, there may be situations where the size of the corporate estate
might make it meaningless to call a shareholders' meeting to determine
the path to be chosen. However, since the receivership exists essentially for the benefit of the public investors, they should be consulted to
determine whether they wish to continue their investment, or whatever is left of it, in the corporate vehicle or whether they wish the
return of their funds. In those situations where the value of the
receivership assets makes it inappropriate to call a meeting of
shareholders, the views of the receiver and the SEC, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, should be followed. But, in all situations, no matter what assets remain in the receivership, the court, the
SEC, and the receiver should recognize that the equity receivership is
a flexible tool which should be applied in each case for the greatest
good without stringent and technical obedience to procedural
niceties. 228 If the receivership is utilized with such flexibility, its
exhumation from the chancellor's crypt will have been for the public
good.*
227.

See, e.g., SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

228. Thus, for example, the SEC should not require a formal proxy statement for the calling
of a shareholders' meeting or an elaborate registration statement for a corporate transaction
which would otherwise require such a document. The advantage of an equity receivership over
bankruptcy is demonstrated in SEC v. W. L. Moody & Co., 374 F. Supp. 465 (S.D. Tex. 1974).

* Shortly before presstime, the Supreme Court agreed to review a decision which granted
standing to a receiver to maintain an action under SIPA (15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (1970)) to
compel SIPC to act. SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted sub nom. SIPC v. Barbour, 43 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974) (No. 73-2055).

